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timeout	 in	 Europe	 is	 coming	 to	 an	 end.	 The	 international	
environment	is	reverting	to	a	condition	in	which	the	use	of	
force	among	states,	including	countries	in	the	Baltic	Sea	re-






possibilities	 are	 emerging	 for	 extraction	 and	 transportation	

















disaster	 or	 armed	 attack	 affecting	 Sweden,	 is	 politically	































conducive	 to	 strengthening	 security	 in	 the	Baltic	 Sea	 region.	
Closer	 political	 and	military	 co-operation	 in	 the	 region	may	
serve	 as	 a	 preventative	 and	 deterrent	 measure,	 and	 enable	
a	faster	and	better	co-ordinated	response	in	the	event	of	a	crisis.
Politically,	 Sweden’s	 perception	 of	 the	 geopolitical	 changes	
in	the	Baltic	Sea	and	the	High	North	regions	may	strengthen	





In	 the	military	dimension,	Sweden	will	 seek	 to	 improve	 the	
interoperability	between	its	Armed	Forces	and	NATO,	for	ex-













































a	 considerable	 capacity	 to	defend	country’s	 territory.	As	 the	 se-














































The	 doctrine	 of	 neutrality,	 to	 which	 Sweden	 adhered	 until	 the	
early	1990s,	has	become	an	element	of	national	identity	so	deeply	























i. From neutrality to non-alignment
Dating	back	to	 1812,	Swedish	neutrality	meant	neutrality	during	
wartime:	 it	was	 not	 stipulated	 in	 international	 agreements,	 but	

















































during the cold War, sweden also declared itself to be a neu-








be	 to	 quickly	 obtain	 assistance	 from	 the	West.	 Therefore,	 suc-
cessive	 Swedish	 governments	 covertly	 co-operated	 with	 NATO	
member	states,	in	order	to	ensure	assistance	for	Sweden	from	the	
Alliance’s	air	 forces	 if	needed5.	Moreover,	 its	status	as	a	neutral	
state	allowed	Sweden	to	position	itself	as	an	impartial	mediator	in	
conflicts	and	crises	the	world	over,	and	its	active	policies	within	
the	United	Nations	 strengthened	 its	 international	position.	The	
Sweden’s	policy	of	neutrality	applied	to	classic	armed	interstate	
conflicts	but	not	to	UN	peace	operations.
the end of the cold War changed the fundamental circum-
stances of sweden’s defence policy.	The	geopolitical	changes	in	










territory	 during	 peace,	with	 Sweden	 as	 a	 neutral	 state	 and	with	 Finland	
connected	with	the	Soviet	Union	by	the	1948	Finnish-Soviet	treaty.
5	 As	demonstrated	by	a	 1994	report	of	 the	 so-called	Neutrality	Commission	ap-
pointed	by	the	Swedish	parliament	to	examine	the	neutrality	policy	during	the	
Cold	War.	See	Olof	Santesson,	Neutralitetspolitiken	i	praktiken,	in	Kungl Krigs-
















in	 failed	 states.	 In	accordance	with	 this	definition,	sweden be-





the	 1990s,	 Sweden	 has	 pursued	 this	 crisis	 management	 policy	










The	 end	of	 the	Cold	War	 also	marked	 the	beginning	 of	sweden’s 











6	 Although	under	the	 ‘defence	clause’	 (Art.	42(7))	 the	provisions	on	aid	and	





















of	 strategic	 bomber	flights	 in	 the	High	North,	 cyber-attacks	 and	
protests	over	the	removal	of	the	Bronze	Soldier	monument	in	Es-
tonia)	triggered	a	process	of	re-evaluations of sweden’s security 
policy.	 However,	 the	 psychological	 breakthrough	 occurred	 only	

























8	 Swedish	 government,	 Regeringens	 proposition	 2008/2009:140,	 Ett	 an-























during the cold War, while	Sweden	remained	neutral,	the	coun-






the	 arrival	 of	 assistance	 from	NATO).	 This	 required	maintain-
ing	 large	armed	forces	and	universal	conscription,	considerable	
defence	 capabilities,	 and	 independence	 from	 external	 supplies	
of	 armament	 and	military	 equipment.	 Sweden	 also	 applied	 the	





after the end of the cold War, Sweden	 stuck	with	 the	 armed	


























started	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 transformation,	which	 lasted	 from	
2005	 to	2009,	and	were	clearly	aimed	at	 transforming	 the	Swe-
dish	Armed	Forces	in	line	with	the	expeditionary force model.	
These	reforms	were	aimed	at	giving	the	armed	forces	capability	to	




(and	a	blueprint)	 for	 the	 transformation10.	Apart	 from	reducing	
the	number	of	troops,	 the	transformation	was	also	aimed	at	ex-





the russian-georgian war of august 2008 prompted swe-
dish politicians to revise their thinking about the strate-
gic timeout.	 In	 the	 2009	Defence	Decision12,	 the	 Swedish	 gov-
ernment	 put	 the	 task	 of	 safeguarding	 territorial	 integrity	 and	












12	 Swedish	 government,	 Regeringens	 proposition	 2008/2009:140,	 Ett	 an-



















the	 broad	 definition	 of	 national	 security,	 and	 Sweden’s	 neigh-









ment	and	military	equipment	 to	 several	 reserve	units,	 and	 the	
reintroduction	as	of	2013	of	four	regional	commands	(dissolved	in	
the	1990s),	whose	task	was	to	carry	out	joint	operations	and	co-	



















iii. sWeden declares solidarity
The	consequence	of	 increased	 intraregional	 links,	 the	 transfor-
mation	of	the	Swedish	military	into	an	expeditionary	force,	and	
the	 perceived	 deterioration	 of	 regional	 security	 led	 to	 the	 revi-
sion	of	Sweden’s	security	policy	and	its	break	with	the	tradition	
of	non-involvement	and	 independence	 in	 its	defence	policy.	The	
text	of	the	Defence	Decision	for	2010-2014	adopted	in	March	2009	











sweden’s declaration was both an expression of geopolitical 
necessity and an attempt to solve the problem of ensuring the 
country’s security in the face of perceived rising instability 

































sweden’s adoption of the ‘declaration of solidarity’ coincided 
with a stepping-up of military co-operation with the nordic 
states and nato in northern europe. 
Exercises	 by	 individual	 branches	 of	 the	 armed	 forces	 have	 be-
come	an	important	element	of	the	nordic defence co-operation 
(NORDEFCO)	 launched	 in	 2009.	 This	 particularly	 concerns	 the	
air	forces:	exercises	have	taken	place	in	the	High	North	(involv-
ing	 Sweden,	 Norway	 and	 Finland);	 exercises	will	 take	 place	 in	
southern	Sweden	and	northern	Denmark	(involving	Sweden	and	
Denmark,	as	agreed	in	November	2012)15;	and	Sweden	also	plans	









in	 the	 surveillance	 of	 Iceland’s	 air	 space,	 but	 not	 in	 policing	 it;	 that	 is,	




















Sweden	has	also	started	to	step	up	its	involvement in nato ex-
ercises and operations.	While	 the	development	of	military	co-
operation	 (in	 the	beginning	 involving	 the	Swedish	Army	alone)	
had	 originally	 been	 aimed	 at	 improving	 interoperability	 with	
a	view	 to	 taking	part	 in	 foreign	operations,	 after	2009	regional	
collaboration	 increasingly	 became	 the	 point	 of	 reference.	 The	














country’s	 security	 despite	 Sweden	not	 being	 a	NATO	member.	
Because	 of	 its	 active	 involvement	 in	 co-operation	with	NATO,	
Sweden	even	started	to	be	dubbed	“NATO’s	partner	number	one”	
or	“Ally	twenty-nine”17.	

















iV. sWeden’s deFence Policy in crisis 
nevertheless, the ‘declaration of solidarity’ began to be per-
ceived in sweden as an illusory solution to the problem of 





of	 solidarity.	 Their	 conclusions	 reveal	 an	 ambivalent	 picture	 of	
the	military.	The	audit	of	the	Armed	Forces’	ability	to	accomplish	
their	 tasks,	which	was	carried	out	 in	2012	by	analysts	 from	the	
Royal	Swedish	Academy	of	War	Sciences,	presents	a	dual	picture18.
The	 transformation	 into	 an	 expeditionary	 force	 capable	 of	 re-
sponding	 flexibly	 to	 various	 kinds	 of	 challenges	 in	 crisis	man-
agement	operations,	which	has	been	underway	for	several	years,	
is	generally	regarded	to	have	been	a	success.	sweden currently 
possesses a military force that can be deployed on foreign 
missions, and has both high-quality armament and military 












lis	Neretnieks,	Military-Strategic	Options,	 in	Bo	Hugemark	 (ed.),	 Friends	
















At	the	same	time,	however,	serious	doubts have been expressed 
about the swedish armed Forces’ ability to fulfil tasks re-
lated to defending sweden’s territory and carry out effec-
tive operations in the event of crises or conflicts in the re-
gion.	 Firstly,	 research	 by	 the	 Royal	 Academy	 of	War	 Sciences19	
showed	 that	while	 the	Swedish	Armed	Forces	were	prepared	 to	
co-operate	with	NATO	in	case	of	low-intensity	crises,	they	would	
face	mounting	 problems	 as	 the	 crises	 escalated,	 for	 instance	 if	
Swedish	territory	were	to	be	used	to	establish	bases	for	a	NATO	
operation	to	support	the	Baltic	states,	and	Sweden	faced	the	risk	
of	 a	 pre-emptive	 strike	 from	 Russia	 aimed	 at	 creating	 political	
pressure	and/or	destroying	military	infrastructures.	In	the	case	
of	the	Army,	the	problems	include	the	absence	of	medium-range	
air	 (and	missile)	 defence	 systems,	 and	 difficulties	with	 deploy-
ing	a	larger	number	of	adequately	trained	personnel.	The	use	of	






































the causes of this state of affairs include excessive cuts to the 
size of the armed Forces over the last ten years (see	Appendix	1), 
and the recent abolition of universal conscription and the 









in	 future	 even	 result	 in	 Sweden	 giving	 up	 one	 of	 the	 branches	
of	 its	Armed	Forces22.	After	a	period	of	declining	military	spen-
ding,	Sweden	started	to	expand	its	defence	budget	in	2009.	Mili-
tary	spending	 is	expected	 to	slightly	 increase	 in	absolute	 terms	
in	the	coming	years	(currently	it	stands	at	around	US$6.2	billion;	
see	 Appendix	 2).	 However,	 given	 Sweden’s	 projected	 econo-
mic	 growth,	 the	 proportion	 of	 GDP	 earmarked	 for	 defence	will	




25	 January	 2013,	 http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/det-ar-nagot-helt-ex-
ceptionellt_7858986.svd
21	 Riksrevisionen,	 Bemanningen	 av	 marines	 och	 flygvapnets	 stående	 in-





























of	 addi	tional	 financing	 over	 the	 period	 in	 question.	 In	 January	
2013	the	Swedish	government	decided	to	purchase	60	new	multi-	
-role	 JAS-39E/F	 fighter	 aircraft.	 That	 purchase	 will	 consume	







bers25,	gave	rise	to	the most heated discussions since the end of 
the cold War among analysts, the military and politicians, 
who have been arguing about sweden’s defence policy and 




































Those	 discussions	 are	 of	 major	 significance	 –	 in	 2014	 Sweden	
will	 hold	 parliamentary	 elections,	 and	 in	 2015	 the	 government	
and	parliament	are	to	adopt	a	new	Defence	Decision	for	the	years	

























































sweden thus faces a major challenge of how to shape its de-






(1) remaining outside nato is	one	option	which	nevertheless	
would	lead	to	increased	military	spending	and	defence	capabili-
ties,	in	line	with	the	reasoning	that	non-involvement	in	military	
alliances	 entails	 an	 obligation	 to	 put	more	 effort	 into	 ensuring	
one’s	own	security.	However,	the	largest	coalition	party,	the	Mode	-	
rates,	is	unwilling	to	increase	the	defence	budget	considerably,	as	
its	priority	now	is	 to	maintain	budgetary	discipline,	even	 if	 the	
smaller	coalition	partners	(the	Liberals	and	the	Christian	Demo-
crats)	support	increasing	defence	spending.	The	opposition	is	also	
split	 on	 the	 issue	–	 the	Social	Democrats	have	not	 ruled	out	 in-
creased	spending,	while	the	Greens	are	critical	of	it28.
(2) Joining nato:	 in	 terms	 of	 Sweden’s	 domestic	 politics,	 this	
would	be	a	very	difficult	process,	and	carrying	it	out	while	con-
forming	with	 Swedish	 political	 culture	would	 require	 building	
a	 political	 consensus	 of	 a	majority	 of	 parliamentary	 parties,	 as	



























to	 increase	defence	spending	 in	order	 to	be	regarded	as	a	relia-
ble	member	of	the	Alliance.	The	negative	attitude	of	the	Swedish	
public	 is	also	an	 important	 factor	 in	the	membership	debate.	 In	
a	2012	survey,	47%	of	Swedes	favoured	staying	out	of	NATO,	with	
30%	backing	accession30.	The	Swedish	people	still	widely	believe	








formulas	 for	 co-operation	with	 its	most	 active	 partners,	which	
could	be	applied	after	the	period	of	intensive	co-operation	on	the	
Afghanistan	mission	 is	 over,	 offers	 some	 opportunities	 for	 fur-





challenges	 such	 as	 cyber-security,	 energy	 security,	 combating	
terrorism	and	the	proliferation	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction.	
29	 Sven	 Hirdman,	Medlemskap	 i	 Nato	 skulle	 öka	 spanningar,	 Svenska Dag-






















(3) Further development of nordic defence co-operation32 




the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 Sweden,	 but	 also	 for	 Finland	 and	 Norway	
(albeit	less	so	for	Denmark).	The	strategic	proximity,	in	both	the	
regional	and	the	global	dimension,	strongly	underpinned	by	the	






other	 regional	 players,	 the	Nordic	 states	 are	 unwilling	 to	 limit	
their	 co-operation	 options	 to	 their	 neighbours	 alone.	 Denmark	
and	Norway,	being	NATO	members,	have	ruled	out	the	possibil-
ity	of	Nordic	 co-operation	becoming	 ‘independent’	 and	 forming	
an	alternative	 to	NATO	 in	 the	region.	This	 is	 supposed	 to	 serve	
































ing	 capabilities	 and	 resources,	 i.e.	 so-called	 pooling	&	 sharing,	
is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 Sweden’s	 vision	 of	Nordic	 co-operation”34.	
This	 proposal	 goes	 further	 than	 even	 the	most	 advanced	NOR-






forward	 in	 Sweden	 to	 establish a swedish-Finnish military 
alliance	 based	on	 the	non-aligned	 status	of	both	countries.	Re-








statements	 are	 not	 the	 only	 indications	 that	 a	 Swedish-Finnish	
military	 alliance	 is	 unlikely	 to	materialise.	 The	 Finns	 are	 cau-
tious	about	military	alliances	with	Sweden	for	historical	reasons,	




35	 Finnish	 Broadcasting	 Company	YLE,	 Finnish-Swedish	 defence	 pact	 issue	
raised,	13	January	2013,	http://yle.fi/uutiset/finnish-swedish_defense_pact_	
issue_raised/6449010

















Independence	 in	 1917–1918,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 Sweden	 refused	 to	
offer	 military	 assistance	 to	 Finland	 during	 the	 Finnish-Soviet	
Winter	War	of	1939–1940.	Even	though	the	two	countries	had	co-
-operated	militarily	in	the	1930s,	and	Sweden	had	been	discussing	








on the other hand, sweden is not considering the option of 
developing closer co-operation within the european union.	
Even	though	the	EU	has	adopted	the	‘defence	clause’,	for	Sweden	






none of the proposed solutions to sweden’s security dilem-
mas is simple or easily practicable for the current ruling coa-
lition. considering the circumstances discussed above, it is 
unlikely that a thorough change of sweden’s defence policy 
























issue	 the	 new	 Defence	 Decision	 for	 2015–2018,	 will	 be	 however	




cerning	changes	 to	 the	defence	policy	and	reform	of	 the	Armed	
Forces,	while	building	broad	inter-party	consensus	on	the	issue.	
In	the	coming	years	Sweden	will	probably	remain	outside	NATO,	
make	 some	adjustments	 to	 its	military	 reform	and	 increase	de-




















Vi. sWedish deFence Policy and the Baltic 
sea region
For sweden’s partners in the region, the absence of a major 
change in swedish defence policy that would lead towards 
membership in nato means continued uncertainty about 
what the country will do in the event of an actual crisis 
or conflict in the region.	Will	 the	Swedish	government	show	
‘solidarity’	 and	 offer	 assistance,	 should	 any	 such	 scenario	ma-
terialise?	Or	will	the	public’s	deeply	rooted	tendency	not	to	get	
involved	 in	 the	 problems	 of	 Sweden’s	 neighbours	 prevail	 over	
a	formally	declared	‘solidarity’?	Will	Sweden’s	‘solidarity’	mean	
merely	non-passivity,	or	will	it	come	in	the	form	of	military	as-






country’s	partners	in	the	region.	the changes in sweden’s de-
fence discourse and policy may be conducive to strengthen-
ing security in the Baltic sea region, even though they are 
less likely to lead to closer bilateral defence co-operation be-
tween Poland and sweden. 
regional formats of political and military co-operation of-
fer possibilities for working together with sweden.	It	should	
be	noted	in	this	context	that	bilateral,	multilateral	and	regional	
military	co-operation,	either	within	or	outside	NATO,	is	becom-
ing	an	 increasingly	 important	 instrument	 in	 safeguarding	 the	
39	 Bo	Ljung,	Tomas	Malmöf,	Karlis	Neretnieks	and	Mike	Winnerstig	(publ.),	
The	Security	and	Defensibility	of	the	Baltic	States.	A	Comprehensive	Analy-























in the political dimension, Sweden’s	perception	of	the	geopo-
litical	changes	taking	place	in	the	Baltic	Sea	and	High	North	re-
gions	 could	 strengthen	 those	voices	 in	NATO	 (and	even	 in	 the	
EU)	which	point	to	the	growing	instability	and	likelihood	of	cri-
ses	 in	 the	peripheries	of	NATO	and	 the	EU.	For	NATO	and	 the	
EU,	Sweden	is	an	‘impartial’	player	in	regional	security	issues,	
unlike	Norway,	which	has	its	own	interests	in	the	High	North,	









in the military dimension, Sweden	will	be	interested	in	seek-
ing	new	forms	of	military	co-operation	with	NATO	in	the	region.	
The	Swedes	are	aware	of	the	need	to	ensure	their	Armed	Forc-
es’	 interoperability	with	NATO	beyond	 the	period	of	 intensive	
co-operation	 on	 foreign	 missions	 in	 Afghanistan,	 Kosovo	 and	
Libya.	They	have	also	been	promoting	the	concept	of	new-type	
partnerships	 between	 NATO	 and	 partner	 countries.	 Further-
more,	 they	 are	 aware	of	 the	growing	 importance	of	 the	NATO	
Response	 Force	 (NRF)	 in	maintaining	 interoperability	 and	 co-
operation	among	the	NATO	members	within	the	framework	of	











































uary	 2013,	 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_93824.htm.	 See	
also	Guillaume	Lasconjarias,	The	NRF:	from	a	Key	Driver	of	Transformation	
to	a	Laboratory	of	the	Connected	Forces	Initiative,	Research	Paper	No.	88,	
NATO	 Defense	 College,	 January	 2013,	 http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/
series.php?icode=1
41	 Ewa	Stenberg,	Regeringen	öppnar	för	att	gå	med	i	Natos	insatsstyrka,	Da-




















of	NATO),	 the	Nordic	 states	are	Sweden’s	main	partners	 for	de-
fence	co-operation	–	this	applies	both	to	exercises	and	training,	
and	to	armament	and	military	equipment	co-operation	–	because	
of	 the	 geographical	 proximity,	 linguistic	 and	 cultural	 similari-
ties,	as	well	as	some	similarities	with	regard	to	the	armament	and	
military	equipment	held.	For	these	reasons	Poland is not among 
sweden’s priority co-operation partners, and is regarded pri-
marily as a nato member in the region.	Sweden	and	Poland	






































size of the swedish armed Forces (operational component/






















































*Soldiers of the contract units have civilian jobs, and are 





**Only a small proportion of Home Guard soldiers 
work for the military on a permanent basis. The 
remainder are volunteers with civilian jobs
Several	 thousand	 troops	 serving	 in	 the	 command	 and	 logistics	
structures	should	be	added	to	the	above.


















sweden’s military spending in 1989–2011  


































































Sweden’s military spending in 1989–2011  
year military spending in  us$ billion, according to siPri
1989 7.239
1990 7.375
1991 6.947
1992 6.751
1993 6.731
1994 6.716
1995 6.731
1996 6.819
1997 6.478
1998 6.663
1999 6.916
2000 7.167
2001 6.699
2002 6.521
2003 6.473
2004 6.092
2005 6.172
2006 6.075
2007 6.235
2008 5.545
2009 5.438
2010 5.886
2011 5.960
